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Abstract
We present a model of bank passivity and regulatory failure. Banks with low equity positions
have more incentives to be passive in liquidating bad loans. We show that they tend to hide
distress from regulatory authorities and are ready to offer a higher rate of interest in order to
attract deposits compared to banks that are not in distress. Therefore, higher deposit rates may
act as an early warning signal of bank failure. We provide empirical evidence that the balance
sheet information collected by the Czech National Bank is not a better predictor of bank
failure than higher deposit rates. This confirms the importance of asymmetric information
between banks and the regulator and suggests the usefulness of looking at deposit rate
differentials as early signals of distress in emerging market economies where banks’ equity
positions are often low.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Banking crises in emerging market economies have been a regular feature in
recent years. Mexico, the East Asian economies, Russia and Turkey were all hit hard
within less than 10 years and almost all countries in Central and Eastern Europe have
experienced turbulence in their banking and financial sectors
1.
Such crises usually reveal bank passivity, i.e. a failure to liquidate bad loans.
Instead, banks engage in covering up bad loans, which most often leads to a
worsening of their financial situation. These issues have been widely studied. (For
transition economies, e.g., Mitchell et al., 1993, 1997; Bergl￿f and Roland, 1997.)
Banking regulation is usually seen as the remedy to bank passivity and cover-ups. In
the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, there was strong insistence on the introduction
of rules creating greater transparency in the banking sector. However, achieving better
regulation is not just a matter of changing the rules and increasing reporting
requirements of banks to regulators. Better rules will not by themselves prevent banks
from hiding important information from the regulator. Indeed, there is a fundamental
problem of asymmetric information between the regulator and banks and high costs of
monitoring usually do not allow informational asymmetries to be easily overcome.
(Aghion, Bolton and Fries, 1998 analyse the issue of how to elicit truthful information
from the banks.)
In this paper, our analysis is more positive than normative in that we try to
understand the behaviour of banks and regulators in the transition context, and more
generally in the context of emerging market economies. We highlight the role ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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interest rates in relation to bank passivity and regulatory failure. Banks that are in
greater danger of financial distress and have relatively low equity positions are shown
to have more incentives to behave passively toward bad loans than banks with higher
equity positions. Those banks also have a greater tendency to hide a situation of
distress from regulatory authorities, thus making it more difficult for the latter to
detect distress early on. We also demonstrate that banks with low equity positions will
be ready to offer a higher rate of interest than banks that are not in distress in order to
attract deposits. Higher deposit rates may thus act as an early warning signal of bank
failure, a feature that has already been noticed in the empirical finance literature (see
e.g.. Ellis and Flannery, 1992; Wheelock and Wilson, 1995).
We confront the results of the model with balance sheet information of banks
collected by the Czech National Bank. We focus on data from the Czech banking
crisis 1994 to1996. We show that these data are not a better predictor of banking
failure than higher deposit rates, therefore showing that the regulator does (did) not
have privileged information on banks, despite the existing reporting rules.
The idea that competition between banks on depositor rates is harmful has
been present for a long time in the banking literature. Kane (1989) and Cole et al.
(1995) have analysed the effect of deregulation, and in particular the elimination of
deposit rate ceilings (regulation Q), on the S and L crisis in the US. More recent
empirical work has established a correlation between increases in interest rates and
the occurrences of financial crises (Demirg￿c-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). While the
incentive effects of equity regulations on various forms of risk-taking are pretty well
                                                                                                                                                                     
1 In the early 1990s, for example, Poland￿s banks experienced a crisis, followed in 1994-1996 by the
failure of several small banks in the Czech Republic, and severe problems in Latvia in 1995 when four
of its large banks failed.  For a detailed description and overall picture see EBRD, 1996-1997.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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understood (see e.g. Rochet, 1992; Bolton and Freixas, 2000, and the subject of a very
vast literature, there have been surprisingly few models focusing on the perverse
effects of deposit rate competition. An important exception is Hellman, et al., 2000).
They constructed a model showing that high equity requirements without deposit rate
ceilings lead to inefficiently high amounts of equity requirements in order to push the
bank to avoid excessive risk-taking. As stated above, our model is less normative than
positive, modelling the effects of differences in equity on interest rate competition and
on subsequent bank failure with the purpose of testing empirically this relationship.
Moreover, we focus on banks￿ passivity in hardening the budget constraints of firms
rather than on their choice of assets. In other words, we focus more on the issue of the
quality of a bank￿s loan portfolio, an important issue in understanding financial crises,
rather than on its risk-taking behaviour.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 introduces the theoretical model;
section 3 describes the emergence of the Czech banking sector; section 4 presents the
empirical evidence in the case of Czech Republic￿s banking crisis; and the final
section carries conclusions and possible policy implications.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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2. THE MODEL
The model combines elements from the Mitchell (1997) and the Dewatripont-
Maskin (1995) model and is close to the Bergl￿f and Roland (1997) model. The latter
is augmented to analyze the interest rate setting by low and high-equity banks.  We
first show that banks in distress will be ready to offer a higher rate of interest to attract
deposits compared to banks that are not in distress, and thus, why higher deposit rates
may act as an early warning signal of bank failure. Second, we show why the bank
regulator may not have more information than the market.
Consider two different types of banks that differ only in terms of their equity.
Low-equity banks only have equity E in amount of 1. High-equity banks have equity
in amount of E=W, assumed to be ￿large￿. Consider the following game between
banks, enterprises and a banking regulator.
At t=0, enterprises submit projects to banks. We assume each bank faces the
same pool of projects. Even though banks differ in their equity endowment, we
assume that they all have only one liquid unit of funds, which is exactly the amount
required to finance all the projects facing a bank. There is, however, asymmetric
information on project types. A proportion α  of ￿good￿ projects yield at t=1 a
verifiable return Rg to the bank and a nonverifiable private benefit Bg to the enterprise
management
2. A proportion (1-α ) of projects are ￿poor￿ projects that yield the same
results only if the enterprise exerts effort. If no effort is exerted, then the project yields
no verifiable return or private benefit at t=1.
                                                          
2 The private benefit Bg is then net of effort.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
5
The project can then either be liquidated or refinanced. If it is liquidated, then
it yields at t=2 a liquidation value L for the bank and a private benefit of 0 for the
enterprise. If it is refinanced, however, one unit of fund is necessary per project
refinanced. In this case, there is a probability q that the project yields at t=2 a
verifiable return of Rp and a probability (1-q) that it yields a liquidation value Ls<L.
We also assume that Ls<1. In both cases (good or bad verifiable return), a private
benefit of Bp is assumed to accrue to the enterprise management. Refinancing of poor
projects is assumed to happen via funds generated at t=0 but also by attracting retail
deposits. It is assumed that α Rg<(1-α ) so that refinancing always requires attracting
new deposits in an amount of (1-α )-α Rg. We assume that the total supply of funds is
inelastic and lower than (1-α )-α Rg so that banks compete for deposits by bidding up
the deposit interest rate r.
The bank￿s decisions to liquidate or refinance matter to the regulator. We
assume that at t=2, at the end of the game, the regulator must bail out banks that have
a negative net position, due to deposit insurance. The regulator thus has an interest in
preventing ex ante such bailouts by engaging in monitoring the banks. The regulator
is particularly interested in preventing banks from ￿gambling for resurrection￿ by
refinancing poor projects, knowing that the downside will be bearded by the regulator.
To be precise, we assume that q(Rp-1)+(1-q)(Ls-1)<1, i.e. that the net expected return
on a bad project is negative and thus is expected to deteriorate the balance sheets of
banks. Whether or not banks will want to engage in gambling for resurrection is still,
however, a very different matter that we will analyze more in detail below. We will
assume for now that there are grounds for such a temptation by assuming that q(Rp-
1)+(1-q)(Ls-1)>L, i.e. that the net ex post return from refinancing is strictly positive.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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Indeed, since the initial funds injected are a sunk cost, the bank will only compare the
ex post return to refinancing and to liquidation. The expected ex post return from
refinancing is thus assumed to be higher than the expected return to liquidation.
We will say that a bank is active when it liquidates poor projects at t=1 and
that it is passive when it refinances these projects. The enterprise￿s behavior depends
very much on whether the bank is active or not. We assume that Bp>Bg>0. The
inequality on the left means that if banks are passive, enterprises with poor projects
prefer to choose low effort because they derive a higher net private benefit. On the
other hand, the inequality on the right means that enterprises prefer to choose high
effort because they are better off compared to the alternative of liquidation. Thus, if
banks are active and are expected to liquidate poor projects, i.e. if enterprises have
hard budget constraints, enterprises will choose a high effort level. Conversely, if they
have soft budget constraints and expect to be refinanced, they will choose not to exert
effort.
We assume that the bank monitoring activity of the regulator takes the form of
deciding on a probability D of detecting whether the firm is passive or not. When a
bank is detected being passive, the bank management is fired and has a payoff of 0.
We assume that the bank management derives a private benefit ρ   from keeping their
jobs and thus get hurt when fired. Bank managers thus potentially trade off the
expected benefits from gambling for resurrection with the expected costs of getting
fired.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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Now that we have defined the relations between enterprises and banks and
between banks and regulators, let us define exactly the timing of decisions in the full
game.
At t=0, the regulator decides on a level of D and spends C(D) on monitoring
activities. We assume that C(D)  is a convex function. The bank lends money to
enterprises and enterprises with poor projects decide on their effort level.
At t=1, returns of projects are observed. Banks decide to be active or passive,
and compete to attract deposits for refinancing of poor projects if that is their choice.
Call  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ a a bank￿s choice of level of ￿activity￿ in liquidating poor projects.
Directly afterwards, the government monitors and fires passive bank managers it has
detected.
At t=2, the government bails out banks with a negative net position.
Even though we have a three-tier hierarchy, the analysis can concentrate on
the government-bank relationship. Indeed, enterprise behavior is easy to characterize.
It is obvious that firms have soft budget constraints if and only if  g p B B a ≥ − ) 1 (.
Given that Bp  > Bg  firms will have hard budget constraints only if the bank is
sufficiently active, i.e. if 
p
g
B
B
a a − = > 1 ~ .
The next question we ask is critical. What is the maximum interest rate banks
are willing to offer, as a function of their equity, at which they prefer to refinance
poor projects rather than to liquidate them?
If a bank is active and thus if enterprises exert high effort, bank management
will have at t=2 a payoff ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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ρ + + − g R E 1
It is clear in this case that the bank will be in a healthy position whatever its
initial equity position since Rg+ρ >0. However, in order to understand the incentive of
a bank to be passive or active, we must look at the bank￿s incentive after low effort
has been exerted. If the bank decides to be active, its expected position will be
L R E g ) 1 ( 1 α α − + + − .
If however it decides to be passive, its expected position will be
)} 1 ]( ) 1 [( ) 1 ( 1 , 0 max{ ) 1 (
)] 1 ]( ) 1 [( ) 1 ( 1 [(
r R L E q
r R R E q
g s
g p
+ − − − − + − −
+ + − − − − + −
α α α
α α α
.
In particular, depending on the level of equity, the downside payoff after
refinancing will differ. Indeed, if E=1, then the downside payoff is equal to
) 1 ]( ) 1 [( ) 1 ( r R L g s + − − − − α α α , which is always < 0 since we have assumed that
Ls<1. Thus, when the bank has a large initial equity position, its expected position is
)] 1 ]( ) 1 [( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 1 r R L q qR E g s p + − − − − + − + − α α α .
However, when it has a low initial equity position, its expected position is
)] 1 ]( ) 1 [( ) 1 [( r R R q g p + − − − − α α α ,
where the expression between brackets is assumed to be positive. Note that a bank
with a lower equity position will, everything else equal, benefit from the safety net of
deposit insurance in the bad-return outcome. We can then compare the net return from
refinancing for a high-equity bank and for a low-equity bank. In particular, if r
H is theWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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interest rate offered by the high-equity bank and  r
L is the interest rate offered by the
low-equity bank, the return on refinancing
3 will be equal for r
H and r
L such that
)]. 1 ]( ) 1 [( ) 1 [(
) 1 ]( ) 1 [( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 (
L
g g p
H
g g s p
r R R R q
r R R L q qR
+ − − − − −
= + − − − − − + −
α α α α
α α α α
Developing this expression, we get
] 1 )[ 1 )( 1 ( ) ]( ) 1 [( s
H L
g L q r qr R − − − = − − − α α α .
Since Ls<1, it is clear that the right-hand-side of the equation is positive (and
thus the left-hand side). Therefore, since α Rg < (1-α ), we have that r
L>qr
L> r
H.
This result leads us to the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Low-equity banks will offer a higher deposit interest rate than
high-equity banks. Moreover, high-equity banks will be active while low-equity banks
will be passive.
The first part of proposition 1 follows directly from the fact that the same
return can be obtained with a higher interest rate for a low equity bank since the low-
equity bank will expect to benefit from deposit insurance whereas the high-equity
bank will not. The second part of the proposition follows from the fact that interest
rate competition between low and high-equity banks will take place until the high-
equity banks drop out of the competition. Indeed, since the latter have a lower return
from refinancing for a given interest rate, the upbidding of interest rates will lead high
                                                          
3 Note that the return to refinancing is not the same as the expected position of the bank. The former
must include expenditure α Rg whereas when we compute the latter α Rg is netted out because it is both
an income and an expenditure.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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equity banks earlier to a situation where they prefer to be active, in which case they
get a return of (1-α )L . This result shows us why higher deposit interest rates can act
as a warning signal for bank distress. Indeed, in competing with high-equity banks,
low-equity banks will be ready to offer a higher interest rate precisely because they
expect to be in a distress.
We now analyze the decision of the regulator to monitor banks and see how
this in turn can affect banks￿ incentives. We will look at the incentives of banks with a
low equity level.
They will choose to be active if and only if
L Rg ) 1 ( α α − + +ρ  > (1-D){q[ ) 1 ]( ) 1 [( ) 1 ((
L
g p r R R + − − − − α α α ]+ρ  },
i.e., if 
ρ α α α
α α α
+ +
+ − − − + − −
= >
)]   r ](1 R - ) - [(1 - )R - q[(1
) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ( )[ 1 ( ~
L
g p
L
g g
L
p r R q R q L r R q
D D .
Below this threshold, banks will choose to be active and above it they will
choose to be passive. The regulator therefore need never go beyond  D
~
to achieve the
required incentive effect. The only question becomes whether the regulator gains from
paying the cost of  )
~
(D C to obtain active behavior from banks, with the result of
hardening the budget constraints of enterprises, or whether that cost is higher than the
cost of ex post bail out of banks. Thus, we thus get the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Effective bank regulation will only take place if
] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( ) 1 )[(( 1 ( )
~
( s
L
g L r R q D C α α α − − + − − − ≤
If this inequality is violated, then it does not pay to monitor banks effectively.
This comparison hinges on the relative costs of monitoring banks versus the costs ofWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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bank bailout. In transition economies, both are likely to be high. Whichever is more
important then becomes a question that must be determined empirically.
Note that the regulator need not necessarily engage in active monitoring of the
bank in order to detect passivity. Indeed, the regulator may use information on profit
taxes paid by banks to infer whether banks were passive or not. Indeed, in
equilibrium, active banks generate at t=1 profits Rg and pay taxes tRg , assuming a
proportional tax on profits. Passive banks, on the other hand, generate at t=1 profits
α Rg and pay taxes α t Rg.
4 Thus, by observing tax filings, the regulator could easily
detect passive banks. In that case, a bank that intends to be passive would need to
￿hide￿ and report more profits than it actually made. In other words, a passive bank
would have to report (and pay taxes on) the profits of an active bank, i.e. pay tRg
instead of α tRg. This is a case in which hiding passivity has a cost for the bank.
Again, in order to analyze the bank￿s incentive, we must compare its expected
positions when being active and passive in the event that firms have exerted low
effort. In the former (out of equilibrium) case, the bank will choose to be active, will
not try to hide, and will pay taxes only on its real profits. In the latter case, the bank
will pay excess taxes but will benefit from its gamble for resurrection. A bank will
thus choose to be active if
  ρ α α α ρ α α + + − − − − − > + − + − )] 1 )( ) 1 (( ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
L
g g p g r R tR R q L t R .
This expression can be rewritten as
                                                          
4 The model is of course very stylized, but in reality, banks with a worsening portfolio would
report lower profits to the tax authorities and this could be a useful source of information for bank
regulators.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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g
L L
p g R r q L r R q tR q )) 1 ( 1 ( ] )) 1 ( ( )[ 1 ( ) ( + − − − + − − > − α α α .
The left-hand side represents the net cost of being passive and hiding whereas the
right hand side represents the net benefit. What does inspection of this inequality tell
us?
First, note that if q<α , there is no real cost to hide! Indeed, even though taxes
are paid in amount tRg instead of α tRg, since the downside outcome of refinancing is
insured, it is as if taxes were only paid on qtRg, i.e. on the upside outcome. If,
however, q>α , then a higher tax rate on profit discourages banks from hiding since it
increases the cost of doing so. This discussion is expressed in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3: If detection of passivity can occur via tax filings, then:
a)  if q<α  , banks have no cost of hiding being passive;
b)  if  q>α ,    there is a threshold tax rate
α
α α
−
+ − − − + − −
=
q
R r q L r R q
t
g
L L
p )) 1 ( 1 ( ] )) 1 ( ( )[ 1 ( ~  above which banks
are discouraged from hiding.
                                                                                                                                                                     William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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3. BACKGROUND ON THE CZECH BANKING SECTOR
The first step in reforming the banking sector was law No. 130/1989, approved on
November 15, 1989 creating a central bank, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia
(hereafter SBCS). According to this law, the SBCS was accountable and responsible
for state monetary policy, but not for commercial banking. The law regulating the
commercial banks and the savings and loans sector was approved month later on
December 13, 1989. This law enabled two-tier banking, in that it brought into being
commercial banks and set the basic rules for their operation. The Ministry of Finance
was charged with regulating the banking sector.
5 According to this law, interest rates
were governed by the SBCS and deposits in state financial institutions were
guaranteed by the state. In January 1990, the SBCS transferred its commercial
banking to three newly established banks: Komerčn￿ banka (KB), Vseobecka uverova
(VUB), and Investicni banka (IP, which in 1993 merged with Post office banks as
IPB). On December 20, 1991 new laws on central and other banks were adopted (Nos.
21 and 22/1992). These laws, effective from February 1, 1993, established the
independence of the national bank from the government and gave the SBCS the
authority for banking supervision. On January 1, 1993, the Czech National Bank
(CNB) took over the functions of the SBCS as a result of the split of Czechoslovakia.
The laws on banks also contained clearly specified rules for granting licenses, and
defined a general regulatory framework.
Unfortunately, the conditions for obtaining banking licenses were quite soft,
requiring a minimum subscribed equity capital of only CZK 50 million (US$2
million). This low requirement was increased in April 1991 to CZK 300 millionWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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(US$10 million). On the other hand, the ￿Law on Foreign Exchange￿ protected the
local market against foreign competition preventing firms from directly acquiring
capital abroad.
With such low capital requirements the number of new banks literally exploded
from early 1990, when there was a central bank plus seven banks licensed for
universal banking to 23 by the end of 1990. This trend continued with 36 banks by the
end of 1991 and by 51 by the end of 1992. These newly established banks were small,
with the only significant exception being Agrobanka.
6 In 1993, the rate of new bank
creation slowed, with only 8 new banking licenses granted (See Table 1).  Between
mid-1994 and 1996, the CNB decided not to grant any new bank licenses, most likely
in a response to failures of small and medium-sized banks.
Due to very soft licensing procedures and insufficient screening of license
candidates, many newly formed banks lacked a sufficient capital base, as well as
employees equipped with proper managerial skills and business ethics. Because of
their lack of capital, small and medium-sized banks began to finance clients carrying
out the riskiest projects, which other banks had refused to finance. Due to the standard
adverse selection problem, a higher interest rate only served to attract high-risk
clients. In addition, several new banks were using deposits to extend credit to other
activities of the bank￿s owners, or simply ￿tunnelling￿ the deposited money out of the
bank. Regardless of whether the main reason was incompetence or theft, the overall
effect on the cash flow and balance sheets of these banks was seriously damaging.
7
                                                                                                                                                                     
5 The Federal Ministry of Finance supervised banks and the Ministries of Finance of Czech and Slovak
Republic controlled saving and loans.
6Agrobanka, founded in 1990, became the fifth largest bank in the Czech Republic within a year.
7 The Economist, September 1996: ￿Each of these bank failures stemmed from a deadly cocktail of
mismanagement, orgiastic lending (often to bank￿s own stockholders), and more often than not, fraud￿.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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Several bank failures beginning in December 1993 up set public trust in the banking
sector and had a strong influence on the stability of small and medium-sized banks.
As a reaction to the first three bank failures, the law on banks was amended to
include obligatory insurance on deposits. This insurance covered only the deposits of
citizens up to 100,000 CZK per head and per bank with the premium being limited to
80 percent of the deposit balance on the day of a bank￿s closure. The amendment also
increased the extent and authority of banking supervision granted to the CNB. The
CNB could now impose sanctions for non-compliance ranging from enforcing
corrections and imposing fines to the revocation of banking licenses.
8
After the introduction of deposit insurance, another bank, Ceska banka, filed for
bankruptcy and the new law was applied to its clients. However, when a series of
additional failures soon followed in the election year of 1996, the CNB became far
more generous, with individual clients of the failed banks recovering their full
deposits up to 4,000,000 CZK in contradiction to the law precessions.
The CNB decided to cope with the resulting sensitive political problem of lost
deposits by tightening the licensing procedures and introducing obligatory deposit
insurance. In its efforts to stem the tide of bank failures, the CNB tried two policies.
In early July 1995, it tightened its policies, increasing the minimum reserve
requirements (MRR) and also unifying its rates.
                                                          
8 The CNB was given the authority force to fulfil several obligatory rules; approve/change bank
management; give a penalty up to 50 mil. CZK; enforce reduction of shareholder￿s capital and its
transfer to reserves if these were not sufficient; and withdraw or freeze banking licenses.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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4. DATA AND RESULTS
We were able to get access to the official data collected by the supervisory body of
the CNB.
9 The data set consists of 1995 monthly reports of 20 local banks 14 of
which posed significant problems at some point during the study. Data on retail
interest rates were published monthly in leading newspapers (or in the magazine
Ekonom). The data set containing interest rates is much broader. It contains monthly
rates (checking accounts, and one and two-year deposits) of all Czech local banks
during the period 1994 to 1996. For 1995 it does not make any sense to add foreign
banks or their branches to our sample because of their inherent differences in terms of
services, structure, financing, etc.
10
As suggested by Proposition 1, passive banks (and hence those potentially in
trouble) will offer higher interest rates on their deposits. The situation in the Czech
Republic is clearly depicted in Figure 1. We use symbols ￿1￿ and ￿0￿ to mark those
banks that failed and survived, respectively, during the period 1994-1996. As a
benchmark (denoted by ￿2￿) we use a bank that provided practically no corporate
lending, and therefore for which interest rates should not reflect problems with its
loan portfolio. Figure 1 exhibits a clear pattern for one-year deposits, indicating
generally higher rates for problem banks, in line with the theoretical model.
Moreover, the interest rates differentials between sound and problematic banks
                                                          
9 Let us note for completeness that there exist two sets of publicly available accounting data
represented by a subset of the ASPEKT (or CEKIA) databases of the Czech capital market that covers
annual reports of publicly traded banks. Unfortunately, these data sets are basically useless for applying
our model for two reasons. First, the publicly available information covers only a short version of the
balance sheet and it differs drastically from those data available to regulators. Second, if any additional
public information exists (for example, a standard balance sheet provided by ASPEKT or CEKIA),
then several variables are missing, namely for those banks that were ex-post seen as ￿problematic￿.
10 Although we construct the financial ratios that have been used in models of bank failures, we must
stress that our indicators do not have the same meaning as in the other studies, since all reporting to the
CNB was done according to local accounting standards.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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become even more noticeable over time. It is thus clear that banks with higher interest
rates on term deposits were more likely to fail later on.
Although Figure 1 indicates a strong pattern, we want to test whether the
differences between groups are significant.  Table 5 summarizes several t-tests across
different time periods and duration of term deposits. These results clearly verify that
mean interest rates for problematic banks were significantly higher compared with
those of sound banks. In addition, we see that since the first half of 1994, differences
were statistically significant for both one and two-year term deposits.
11 Moreover, the
mean difference was higher for longer duration term deposits, a finding consistent
with the idea of capturing default risk for the bank via retail deposit rates.
Another key component of the model is the asymmetric information between
banks and the regulator regarding the extent of bad loans on banks￿ balance sheets.
The timing of recapitalisation offers and subsequent revisions of estimates of bad
loans
12 suggest that regulators have incomplete information at the time
recapitalisation is offered. Since we have the official data made available to the
regulator, it is particularly interesting to test empirically how well these data predict
the crisis, thus giving us a rather precise idea of the quality of the information
available.
Our purpose is to demonstrate that the ￿best￿ model based on the regulatory data
does not provide for a very good fit
13. Our search for the best fit is not motivated by
                                                          
11 We suggest excluding checking accounts from our analysis. Usually, the interest rate on these
accounts is not a relevant measure of why clients opted for a particular bank. (We omit whole range of
services offered by the bank.).
12 The cases of Japan and Mexico are well documented.
13 There exists a literature on predicting bank failures in mature market economies (see Looney et. al.,
(1989); Lane et. al,. (1985), Barber et al., (1996), Hwang at al (1997); among others) based on financial
indicators. However, our purpose is less to see how well those models perform in the case of the CzechWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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data-mining considerations but rather by the need to assess the best predictions one
could make on the basis of the regulatory data
14. Moreover, on the basis of our
theoretical model, we should expect that adding the retail interest rate variable into an
econometric model of bank failure should help predict the problem banks. One would
like to test for the relative importance of regulatory data versus interest rates in
helping predict bank failure. Indeed, interest rates may or may not serve as a signal
for future distress. Independently of the interest rate, balance sheet data given to the
regulators may or may not reflect accurately the situation of the bank depending on
whether the accounting data are truthful or not. Balance sheet data may be
uninformative but market data may be more informative. As seen in the model,
problem banks can attract cash via a much higher interest rate on term deposits than
other (i.e., ￿safe￿) banks offer. Unfortunately, this only speeds up the process of
worsening bank conditions.
15
Our core empirical results are the results of the ￿best￿ logit models of the bank
failures with and without interest rate variables as presented in Table 6.
16 The findings
are rather striking. First, the financial indicators, although they were drawn from
official data collected by the supervisory body of the CNB (used in Model I), did not
prove a significantly better predictor of actual bank failure than one-year deposit rates
                                                                                                                                                                     
republic than to understand on the basis of retrospective data how well informed the bank supervisory
authorities were.
14 One should note that there are important differences in local accounting standards for a transition
economy like the Czech republic. Most transition economies still use accounting procedures carried
over from central planning that reflect production rather then profit. It is striking how much local and
international accounting standards differ. For instance, in 1992 Komercni banka reported a profit of 3.2
billion CZK and a loss of 5.9 billion CZK according to local and international standards, respectively.
15 For instance, Cordella and Yeyati (1998) shows that when banks do not control their risk exposure,
the presence of informed depositors may increase the probability of bank failures.
16 Note that selection of other variables or probit specification gave similar results in terms of position
of the regulators.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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alone (Model II).
17 This finding suggests that (unaudited) monthly balance sheets with
detailed information used by the supervisory body of the CNB did not contain more
information (but also not less) with respect to the prediction of actual bank failure
than publicly available interest rate data. Thus, the CNB did not have more
information than the market. Given the rather poor predictive power of models I and
II, this suggests that, despite banking regulations, asymmetric information between
the CNB and the banks remains a serious issue. More importantly, there is an
interesting interaction between the information contained in financial ratios and retail
interest rates. Looking at the results for the first half of 1995 we see that, although
both Models I and II  provide very similar (and not very good) predictions, combining
them (Model III) significantly increases the quality of the predictions.
 18 This strategy
suggests that the information of the CNB and of the market is not the same and that
interest rate information complements the information contained in balance sheets.
Note, however, an interesting difference between the results for the first and the
second half of 1995. For the first half of 1995, model III is better than both models I
and II. However, for the second half of 1995, there ceases to be a significant
difference in the quality of prediction between models I and III. This suggests that the
information in retail deposit rates is reflected in the bank balance sheet data for that
period. A natural interpretation is that the signals provided by the interest rates were
by then incorporated in the balance sheets. One possible scenario is that these early
signals attract the attention of regulators who force the banks to provide more
                                                          
17 Previous t-tests suggest to using two-year deposit rates, although the reason for using one-year rates
instead is simple. For two-year deposit rates we have a few missing observations: not every bank
provided a table of retail interest rates by all maturities and several banks specified longer maturities as
￿negotiable￿. Since we do not want to lose more observations, we opted for one-year interest rate that
was provided by all banks in our sample.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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accurate data, but one can think of various other scenarios. In any case, if there is a
lag between the time when interest rates increase and the time this information is
incorporated into the balance sheet data, then one should conclude that interest rate
differentials can be seen as an early signal of banking distress.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Despite the small sample available, we provide evidence from the Czech banking
crisis that the interest rates differentials between sound and problematic banks were
significant and increasing as bank failures approached. Second, our data support the
assumption that the bank supervisory body did not, despite, banking regulations and
reporting requirements based on private balance sheets, have information (in terms of
quality of early warning signals) superior to publicly available information
incorporated in interest rates. These findings add to the general body of theoretical
and empirical literature on the effects of informational asymmetries in the banking
sector and on the adverse selection effects of interest rate competition. They highlight
the difficulty of overcoming informational asymmetry between banks and the
regulator. Despite calls for more transparency and better reporting rules, informational
asymmetries are likely to continue to be an important part of the financial reality in
emerging markets where fragile equity positions of banks will lead to increased risk-
taking with systemic consequences.
Two lessons stand out from a normative point of view. A first is that the market
interest rates variable should be used to adjust for the default risk of the bank since it
                                                                                                                                                                     
18  Note that neither Model I or II significantly dominate a na￿ve estimator (=1), but their combination,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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is a useful early signal, especially in case of a fragile equity position. Moreover, our
results suggest that it is useful to combine balance sheet and interest rate data since
the information they provide is complementary, at least in early stages. In the Czech
case this approach would significantly improve the quality of the bank supervision
and upgrade any early warning signal. A second lesson relates to the importance of
sound bank capitalization. Indeed, both our model and the empirical evidence suggest
that bank passivity and perverse competition on interest rates are much less of an
issue when banks are sufficiently capitalized.
                                                                                                                                                                     
Model III does.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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Table 1. Number of Banks in Operation in the Czech Republic, 1990 ￿ 1997
Number of banks, eop. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total, of which 9 24 37 52 55 54 53 50
     L a r g e  b a n k s 56666655
     Small banks 4 14 19 22 21 18 12 9
     Foreign banks 4 8 11 12 12 13 14
     Foreign bank branches 3 7 8 10 9 9
     Specialised banks 1 5 7 8 9 9
     Banks under conservatorship 1 1 5 4
Banks without licence 1 4 6
Source:  Reports on Monetary Development in the Czech Republic, CNB 1994-1997
Report on Bank Supervision in the Czech Republic, CNB 1996
Table 2. Share of Total Assets, banks with valid licence as of 31 Dec.1997
End of the period 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total banking sector, of which 100 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
     Large banks 77.18 71.72 68.87 65.67
     Small banks 4.44 4.92 5.21 4.72
     Foreign banks, incl. Branches 11.67 16.46 18.84 22.28
     Specialised banks 1.47 2.11 3.09 4.29
     Banks under conservatorship 5.24 4.78 4.00 3.04
Banks without licence 0.64 2.24 2.42 *2.10
Source:  Reports on Monetary Development in the Czech Republic, CNB 1994-1997
Report on Bank Supervision in the Czech Republic, CNB 1996
Table 3. Consolidation Program of the CNB
Consolidation was done by: Number
of Banks
Share on the
Total Assets of
the banking
sector, June
30, 1996
   ￿  reduction of shareholder￿s capital and conservatorship 5 1.64
   ￿  closing the bank 2 1.24
   ￿ selling the bank and subsequent merging 3 1.66
   ￿  increasing the capital 6 3.98
   No consolidation needed 3 1.13
 Total 
1) 18 8.84
Source: Report on Bank Supervision in the Czech Republic, CNB 1996
1) For one bank two methods were combined: first, reduction of shareholder￿s capital and
conservatorships; and then the bank was merged with other existing bank.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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Table 4. Minimum Reserve Requirement Rates since 1992
Rates (percent) effective by:
11/92 2/93* 7/93 8/94 8/95 8/96 5/97 8/98
Demand deposits 9 9-12 9 12 8.5 11.5 9.5 7.5
Time deposits 3 3-4 3 12 8.5 11.5 9.5 7.5
* Lower rate was used for banks with deposits up to 25 billion CZK, otherwise the higher rate was
applied.
Source: CNB, Monetary indicators.
Table 5. Comparison of average deposit rates (control group vs. problematic banks).
Semiannual data from June 1993 to December 1995
Year Group checking
account
1year term
deposit
2 years term
deposit
￿control￿ 3.48 12.95 14.53
1993.1 ￿problematic￿ 4.44 13.74 14.36
p-value (t-tests) .05** 0.16 0.4
￿control￿ 3.97 13.05 14.44
1993.2 ￿problematic￿ 4.29 13.95 14.72
p-value (t-tests) 0.27 .03** 0.22
￿control￿ 3.61 10.51 13.42
1994.1 ￿problematic￿ 4.21 11.75 13.6
p-value (t-tests) 0.18 .05** .00***
￿control￿ 3.4 9.82 12.83
1994.2 ￿problematic￿ 4.36 10.80 14.51
p-value (t-tests) .08* .10* .05**
￿control￿ 3.17 9.45 11.68
1995.1 ￿problematic￿ 4.47 10.61 13.67
p-value (t-tests) .01*** .03** .00***
￿control￿ 3.56 9.62 11.15
1995.2 ￿problematic￿ 4.68 10.63 12.92
p-value (t-tests) .03** .01*** .01***
 ***  Significant at 1% level, **  Significant at 5% level , *   Significant at 10% level.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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Table 6. Comparison of logit models. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Variable Period 1995/1 Period 1995/2
I. II. III. I. II. III.
Capital adequacy .10
(.65)
-.53
(.39)
.17
(.11)
-.54
(.49)
Equity multiplier -.05
(.09)
2.57
(1.6)
-.04
(.11)
-1.4
(1.2)
Return on Assets -.31
(.22)
-.82
(.61)
-.23
(.56)
-.01
(.88)
Classified Loans Coverage by
Provisions
.05
(.07)
-.83
(.70)
-1.9
(1.3)
-3.0
(2.9)
One year term deposit rate (the
lowest)
.15
(.11)
2.68
(1.8)
.07
(.14)
1.3
(1.5)
One year term deposit rate (the
highest)
-.14
(.18)
-.85
(.84)
-.02
(.22)
.49
(1.1)
R-square 0.1 0.09 0.71 0.35 0.06 0.69
Fraction of Correct Prediction 0.65 0.7 0.9 0.75 0.63 0.88
Test I. vs. II. (p-value)
+ Π
2 (1) = 0.20 (.65) Π
2 (1) = 0.67 (.41)
Test II. vs. III. (p-value)
+ Π
2 (1) = 2.67 (.10)* Π
2 (1) = 2.67 (.10)*
Test I. vs. III. (p-value)
+ Π
2 (1) = 3.57 (.06)* Π
2 (1) = 1.0 (.32)
 **  Significant at 5% level,  *   Significant at 10% level.
+ The test reported here is a chi-square test of whether one model dominates the other in
terms of predictive accuracy. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between these
models in predictive accuracy.  Denote by ￿+￿ the cases where models correctly predicted the
dependent variable, and denote by ￿￿￿ where they do not. The quality of the prediction can
then be summarized in the following table:
Model 1
+￿
Γ
+n 11 n12 n1.
M
o
d
e
l
 
2
￿n 21 n22 n2.
Γ n.1 n.2 n
Corresponding test statistics
21 12
2
21 12 2
1
) (
n n
n n
+
−
= χ    has a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom. For more
details, see Hanousek, 2000William Davidson Institute Working Paper 424
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Figure 1 .One Year Retail Deposit Rates (the highest)
Symbol ￿1￿ indicates the banks that failed during the period 1994-1996, while ￿0￿ denotes those banks which ￿survived￿. As a benchmark (denoted
by 2) we used ￿Plzenska banka￿, the bank that provided practically no corporate lending, and therefore, their interest rates should not reflect problems
with their portfolio of loans.
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